

# Computing maximally-permissive strategies in acyclic timed automata


Emily Clement<sup>1,2</sup>   Thierry Jéron<sup>1</sup>   Nicolas Markey<sup>1</sup>   David Mentré<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>IRISA, Inria & CNRS & Univ. Rennes, France

<sup>2</sup>Mitsubishi Electric R&D Centre Europe – Rennes, France

March 29, 2023


- Mathematical model with perfect clocks



- Robustness


- ▷ Clocks are **imperfects**
- ▷ **Robustness:**
  - (1) model these imperfections
  - (2) verify  $\mathcal{P}$  despite these imperfections.

- A run and its robustness




Permissiveness:  $\min(0, 2) = 0$

- A run and its robustness



Permissiveness:  $\min(1, 1) = 1$

- A run and its robustness



Permissiveness:  $\min(1, 1) = 1$

- Our definition of robustness: the permissiveness function

- ▶ The permissiveness function of a **run** is the **size** of the shortest interval that the player has proposed.
  - ▶ We introduce a **player** (choice of **intervals**  $I$ ) and an **opponent** (choice of **delays**  $\delta$ )
  - ▶ The permissiveness function of a configuration  $(I, v)$  is the permissiveness of the run where the **player maximizes** the permissiveness and the **opponent minimizes** it.

- Topological robustness

- ▷ **Gupta, Henzinger, Jagadeesan** "Robust Timed Automata", 1997
- ▷ Tools: stability theorems.

- Guard enlargement

- ▷ **Sankur** "Robustness in Timed Automata", PhD Thesis, 2013
- ▷ Tools: game theory, parameterized DBM.

- Delay enlargement


- ▷ **Bouyer, Fang, Markey** "Permissive strategies in timed automata and games", AVOCS'15
- ▷ Tools: game theory
- ▷ An algorithm: ✓
- ▷ Multiple clocks: ✗.

- Define our semantic of robustness:
  - ▷ We take a context of **reachability** and of **worst cases**.
  - ▷ We will call this robustness the **permissiveness function**.
- Construct an algorithm that answers the following question:

For a timed automaton  $\mathcal{A}$  and a location  $l$ , compute the permissiveness function.

- Our Method
  - ▷ Construct an algorithm that computes **exactly** the robustness of **any** automaton/configuration.


- The permissiveness: a way to quantify robustness
  - ▷ permissiveness  $\searrow$  = robustness  $\searrow$
  - ▷ A **recursive calculus** of a function  $\mathcal{P}_i(l, v)$ .
- A recursive algorithm to compute the permissiveness



**Gain of the automaton:** minimum of current permissiveness and the permissiveness of the successors



# Permissiveness computation - What is the permissiveness?



- Algorithm by steps

We denote  $moves(l, v)$  the set of available (interval,action):

- ▶ Step 0, if  $l = l_f$ ,  $\mathcal{P}_0(l, v) = +\infty$ , if not, 0
- ▶ Step  $i$ , if  $moves(l, v) = \emptyset$ ,  $\mathcal{P}_i(l, v) = 0$ , if not


$$\mathcal{P}_i(l, v) = \sup_{(a, l) \in moves(l, v)} \min \left( |l|, \inf_{\delta \in l} \mathcal{P}_{i-1}(succ(v, l, \delta, a)) \right).$$


- ▶ The sequence converges to the permissiveness function for acyclic automata **in a finite number of steps**

- Two player games

- ▶ Player: choice of the moves  $(a, l) \in moves(l, v)$
- ▶ Opponent: choice of the delays  $\delta \in l$

- Issues 

- ▶ inf / sup: **infinite** choices & **opposite** strategies:  determine a finite number of strategies to test of the two players:  $\inf \Rightarrow \min$  and  $\sup \Rightarrow \max$ .
- ▶  $\mathcal{P}_i(l, v)$  has to be computed for all  $v$ .

We consider only **linear automata** :no .

- **Lemma for linear T.A**

$v \mapsto \mathcal{P}_i(l, v)$  is a **concave** function over the set of valuations.

- **Consequences**

If the **player** proposes the interval  $[\alpha, \beta]$ , the best strategy of the opponent is to propose the delay  $\alpha$  **or**  $\beta$

$$\mathcal{P}_i(l, v) = \sup_{(a, l) \in \text{moves}(l, v)} \min \left( |l|, \inf_{\delta \in I} \mathcal{P}_{i-1}(\text{succ}(v, l, \delta, a)) \right) \text{ becomes}$$

$$\mathcal{P}_i(l, v) = \sup_{([\alpha, \beta], a) \in \text{moves}(l, v)} \min(|\beta - \alpha|, \min_{\delta = \alpha, \beta} \mathcal{P}_{i-1}(\text{succ}(v, l, \delta, a))).$$

- **Next step**

▷  $\sup \rightarrow \max$

▷ That means, **determine the strategy of the player** .

$$\mathcal{P}_i(l, v) = \sup_{([\alpha, \beta], a) \in \text{moves}(l, v)} \min(|\beta - \alpha|, \min_{\delta = \alpha, \beta} \mathcal{P}_{i-1}(\text{succ}(v, l, \delta, a)))$$

- Goal: Find the interval  $[\alpha, \beta]$  that maximizes:

$$\min(|\beta - \alpha|, \mathcal{P}_{i-1}(\text{succ}(v, l, \alpha, a)), \mathcal{P}_{i-1}(\text{succ}(v, l, \beta, a)))$$


- Tool-Lemma: Property of the permissiveness function

For any  $i$  and any location  $l, v \mapsto \mathcal{P}_i(l, v)$  is an  $n$ -dim **piecewise-affine function**, with bounded number of pieces.

- Issue: How to optimize the minimum of three **piece-wise** affine functions?

- ▷ (1) "Fix" the pieces where  $v + \alpha[r]$  and  $v + \beta[r]$  ends up: an algorithm
- ▷ (2) **Optimize** the minimum of three **affine** functions: a technical lemma

## Strategy of the player for linear automata - The algorithm.



- Goal: which interval  $[\alpha, \beta]$  maximizes

$$\min(|\beta - \alpha|, \mathcal{P}_{i-1}(\text{succ}(v, l, \alpha, a)), \mathcal{P}_{i-1}(\text{succ}(v, l, \beta, a)))?$$

- Steps of the algorithm:

- ▷ (1) Fix two arbitrary cells  $h_\alpha, h_\beta$  s.t.  $v + \alpha[r] \in h_\alpha$  and  $v + \beta[r] \in h_\beta$
- ▷ (2) Compute  $S_{h_\alpha, h_\beta} = \{v \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid \exists \alpha, \beta, v + \alpha[r] \in h_\alpha, v + \beta[r] \in h_\beta\}$
- ▷ (3) Fix  $v \in S_{h_\alpha, h_\beta}$  and compute the intervals of enabled  $\alpha, \beta$ :  $I_\alpha^v, I_\beta^v$
- ▷ (4) **The technical lemma**: find such  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  in  $I_\alpha^v \times I_\beta^v$  s.t.  $\alpha \leq \beta$  that maximizes

$$\min(\beta - \alpha, \mathcal{P}_i(l, v + \alpha[r]), \mathcal{P}_i(l, v + \beta[r])).$$

- ▷ (5) Iterate for all pieces and compare

# Strategy of the player for linear automata - The technical lemma

To maximize the quantity  $\min(\beta - \alpha, a\alpha + b, c\beta + d)$  over  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  in  $[m_\alpha, M_\alpha] \times [m_\beta, M_\beta]$  s.t  $\alpha \leq \beta$ :

- Detail of the case:  $a \geq 0$  and  $c \geq 0$

Condition	coordinates of maximal point	value of maximal point
$\frac{M_\beta - b}{a+1} \leq m_\alpha$	$(m_\alpha, M_\beta)$	$\min\{M_\beta - m_\alpha, cM_\beta + d\}$
$m_\alpha \leq \frac{M_\beta - b}{a+1} \leq \min\{M_\alpha, M_\beta\}$	$(\frac{M_\beta - b}{a+1}, M_\beta)$	$\min\{\frac{aM_\beta + b}{a+1}, cM_\beta + d\}$
$\min\{M_\alpha, M_\beta\} \leq \frac{M_\beta - b}{a+1}$	$(\min\{M_\alpha, M_\beta\}, M_\beta)$	$\min\{aM_\alpha + b, aM_\beta + b, cM_\beta + d\}$






Figure: Value of  $\min(\beta - \alpha, a\alpha + b, c\beta + d)$  over  $\mathbb{R}^2$ , where  $D = \{\alpha \in [m_\alpha, M_\alpha], \beta \in [m_\beta, M_\beta] \mid \alpha \leq \beta\}$

- Other cases: similar.


# Example of this strategy



(a) A two-transitions automaton



(b) Gain in  $l_0$



(c) Gain in  $l_1$


- ▶ Let's take  $h_\alpha = h_\beta = \triangle_{x-y}$ . Then  $S_{h_\alpha, h_\beta} = \square_?$
- ▶ For  $v = (x, y)$ ,  $I_\alpha^v = [0, \min(1-x, 1-y)]$  and  $I_\beta^v = [0, \min(1-x, 1-y)]$
- ▶ Suppose that  $1-x < 1-y$  then  $I_\alpha^v = [0, 1-x]$  and  $I_\beta^v = [0, 1-x]$
- ▶ Let's find  $\alpha < \beta$  in  $I_\alpha^v \times I_\beta^v$  that maximizes  $\min(\beta - \alpha, 1 \cdot \alpha + x, 1 \cdot \beta + x)$

The technical lemma application :


$$a = c = 1 \geq 0, \frac{M_\beta - b}{a+1} = \frac{1-x-1}{1+1} = x/2, m_\alpha = 0, \min\{M_\alpha, M_\beta\} = 1-x.$$

- ▶ If  $x > 1/2$  then,  $\mathcal{P}_2(l_0, v) = 1-x$ , otherwise  $1/2$


# Example of this strategy



(a) A two-transitions automaton



(b) Gain in  $l_0$



(c) Gain in  $l_1$

- ▶ Let's take  $h_\alpha = h_\beta = \triangle_{x-y}$ . Then  $S_{h_\alpha, h_\beta} = \square_?$
- ▶ For  $v = (x, y)$ ,  $I_\alpha^v = [0, \min(1-x, 1-y)]$  and  $I_\beta^v = [0, \min(1-x, 1-y)]$
- ▶ Suppose that  $1-x < 1-y$  then  $I_\alpha^v = [0, 1-x]$  and  $I_\beta^v = [0, 1-x]$
- ▶ Let's find  $\alpha < \beta$  in  $I_\alpha^v \times I_\beta^v$  that maximizes  $\min(\beta - \alpha, 1 \cdot \alpha + x, 1 \cdot \beta + x)$

The technical lemma application :

$$a = c = 1 \geq 0, \frac{M_\beta - b}{a+1} = \frac{1-x-1}{1+1} = x/2, m_\alpha = 0, \min\{M_\alpha, M_\beta\} = 1-x.$$

- ▶ If  $x > 1/2$  then ,  $\mathcal{P}_2(l_0, v) = 1-x$ , otherwise  $1/2$



- Linear automata

For a linear timed automaton, with  $d$  locations and  $n$  clocks, the permissiveness function is a **piecewise-affine concave** function and can be computed in time  $\mathcal{O}(n+1)^{8^d}$ , so in **double-exponential time**.

- Acyclic automata & timed games

For an acyclic timed automaton or for timed games the permissiveness function is a **piecewise-affine** function and can be computed **non-elementary time**






Figure: A timed automaton and its (non-concave) permissiveness function in  $l_0$

# Conclusion - Our contribution





## • Achieved works

Computation of the robustness:

- ▷ Operator: max.
- ▷ 🕒: ✓
- ▷ 🕒 ... 🕒: ✓
- ▷ 🟡➔: ✓
- ▷ Timed games: ✓
- ▷ Constructive algorithm and worst-case complexity: ✓

## • Future works



- ▷ 🟡➔
- ▷ Implementation (Python)
- ▷ General permissiveness function
- ▷ Binary robustness
- ▷ Stochastic opponent